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1. Introduction
The impact of the time horizon on the risk of stock investments is still a subject of intense and
controversial debate within the academic and investment communities.1 A number of closely
related questions are connected with this subject such as e.g.
• What is an adequate way to conceptualise the long term risks of a stock investment?
• In what way does the risk of a stock investment depend on the time horizon (are stocks
more risky or less risky over the long term compared to the short, or is the time horizon ir-
relevant in this case?)
• To what extent and in what way does the “optimal” proportion of stocks in an (typically
simply structured) investment portfolio depend on the time horizon?
• Does, in the long run, an investment in stocks always outperform investments (e.g. bonds)
which are less risky over the short term? (Do stocks always beat bonds?2 And: are bonds
redundant assets on a long term view or are they only relevant as a temporary substitute
(safe haven) in times of stock crashes?3)
• What are the implications for the structure of “optimal” portfolios of long term investors,
as e.g. pension funds or within the scope of private provision for old age retirement?4
(Could even a 100% stock investment be adequate in this case?5)
                                                
1 For topical surveys - with different subjects of main emphasis - cf. e.g. Albrecht (1999), Am-
mann/Zimmermann (1997), Kramer/Weber (1999), Kritzman/Rich (1998) and Rosen (1999).
2 For a current overview see especially Rosen (1999) and Stehle (1998, 1999). A main point in this context
is the different tax treatment of investments in stocks and bonds respectively.
3 Cf. Navon (1998) for a discussion of this question.
4 Cf. e.g. Bodie/Crane (1998) or Albrecht/Maurer (2000).
5 Cf. for a discussion of this question Thaler/Williamson (1994), Asness (1996) and Biermann (1998).
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In addition there is a close connection to the question of the level of the empirical risk pre-
mium of stock investments (compared to bonds) and whether this premium is appropriate
from a theoretical point of view (equity premium puzzle6).
With respect to the contributions to the above questions one can basically distinguish between
a purely historical approach on the one hand and on the other, an approach where the empiri-
cal data are analysed on the basis of a stochastic model for the development of stocks and
bonds respectively. An approach in which historical data are used exclusively and ex post-
performance over different time periods7 is compared, implies the problem8 that the 10-, 15-
or 20-year periods used are strongly overlapping and the resulting roll-over returns have a
high degree of correlation. This results in a serious estimation bias. A high degree of statisti-
cal significance requires independent returns based on non-overlapping 10-, 15- or 20-year
periods. The existing horizon of experience, however, is too short to obtain enough data of
this kind. Navon (1998, p. 67) writes very appropriately: „We mere mortals live only one life.
And we haven’t had sufficient ten-, twenty- or thirty-year periods that are independent of an-
other to derive statistically significant conclusions from history.“
The solution to this dilemma is to base the analysis on an appropriate stochastic model, usu-
ally a version of a random walk9 or a process with mean reversion10, to estimate the parame-
ters using independent observations (over shorter time periods) and finally to obtain the val-
ues desired analytically or by means of simulation.
A second basic distinction of the contributions to the literature in this field is the way in which
the (long term) distributions of prices or returns are evaluated. Here we can distinguish be-
tween approaches where the utility function of the investor is used in an explicit way for the
analysis11 and approaches where the utility function is only used implicitly or not at all. Ex-
amples for the latter class are approaches which analyse the (long term) risk of a stock in-
                                                
6 Cf. for the fundamental contribution by Mehra/Prescott (1985) as well as Albrecht (1999) for a more
topical review.
7 Cf. e.g. Thaler/Williamson (1994) or Stehle (1998, 1999).
8 Bernstein (1996) and topically Löffler (2000) refer to this problem.
9 In the literature the time-continuous model of the geometric Brownian motion (geometric Wiener-
process) serves as standard reference model which, from a time-discrete view, implies independent and
logarithmically normally distributed price increments.
10 A current example for this can be found in Löffler (2000, S. 355).
11 Cf. for an overview e.g. Kritzman/Rich (1998) or Albrecht (1999, chapter 4). Contributions using sto-
chastical dominance, cf. e.g. Levy/Cohen (1998) and Albrecht (1999, section 3.3) belong to these ap-
proaches, too.
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vestment in the framework of the theory of option pricing12 or on the basis of the concept of
shortfall risk.13 Since the utility function of the investor is not explicitly considered in the
analysis, both approaches can be refered to as preference-free. Ammann/Zimmermann (1997,
2000), however, argue that because the utility function is implicit in any floor specification
the assumption of a preference-free determination of risk with the help of option pricing the-
ory is a fallacy. The same argument holds true for the shortfall approach as here, too, different
target returns are considered. Moreover, there are explicit connections between utility theory
and the shortfall approach.14
In this study we analytically quantify the long-term risks of a stock investment within a short-
fall framework with respect to deterministic (real) target returns as well as with respect to a
bond investment. One central conclusion will be that under a worst-case perspective, formal-
ised by the measure of conditional shortfall expectation (or: mean excess loss), an investment
in stocks exhibits an increasing and substantial risk and that this characteristic is the true dan-
ger of a long-term stock investment.
The primary focus of this study is not to answer the question of what ultimately is the correct
measure of risk but to work out different dimensions of risk in the sense of purely probabilis-
tic characteristics of stock price developments. Utility theoretical or behavioral approaches15
which consider these dimensions of risk for evaluation would be the logical next step to be
taken.16
2. Design of the Analysis
Within the contributions to the time-diversification subject which are based on the shortfall
approach, the shortfall probability has been the main focus of consideration. Formally, the
shortfall probability of the return R of an investment with respect to a (deterministic or sto-
chastic) benchmark z - the target return or a desired minimum return - is given by:
                                                
12 Cf. Bodie (1995), Albrecht (1999, section 3.2.1) or Ammann/Zimmermann (2000).
13 Cf. e.g. Leibowitz/Krasker (1998), Zimmermann (1991), Albrecht (1999, section 3.1) and Albrecht/Mau-
rer (2000).
14 Cf. Fishburn (1977) or Albrecht/Maurer/Möller (1999).
15 Cf. e.g. Benartzi/Thaler (1999) or Kramer/Weber (1999).
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).  P(  )SP( zRz <= (1)
The shortfall probability only evaluates the probability of possible shortfalls with respect to
the target but does not evaluate the potential extent of this shortfall.
A risk measure allowing consideration not only of the probability but also the extent of the
shortfall of an investment with respect to the target return is the measure of shortfall expecta-
tion, formally given by:
0)]. , - E[max(  )SE( Rzz = (2)
An additional main risk measure to be used in the subsequent analysis is the mean excess loss
(MEL), formally given by:
].      - E[  )MEL( zRRzz <= (3)
This measure intuitively considers the mean amount of a shortfall with respect to the bench-
mark z under the condition that a shortfall occurs.
The risk measure MEL, the conditional shortfall expectation, is the suitable version for the
purpose of the present contribution of the mean excess- respectively mean excess loss-
function17 E(X - u  X > u) considered in extreme value theory.18 In addition, there is a close
connection of the MEL to the Tail Conditional Expectation (TCE)19, defined by TCE(z) =
E(RR < z). This connection is given by:
TCE(z) = z - MEL(z).
                                                                                                                                                        
16 We share the view of an implicit association to a utility-theoretical analysis, explicitly made clear by
Ammann/Zimmermann (1997, 2000), however, this will not be pursued further in the present contribution.
17 Cf. especially Embrechts/Klüppelberg/Mikosch (1997, p. 160 ff.), Borkovic/Klüppelberg (2000, p. 228f.),
Embrechts/Resnick/Samorodnitsky (1999, p. 35 f.) and Wirch (1999, p. 110).
18 Cf. for the methods of extreme-value theory generally Embrechts/Klüppelberg/Mikosch (1997). For the
use of the extreme-value theory for questions concerning financial risk management cf. Borkovic/Klüp-
pelberg (2000) and Embrechts/Resnick/Samorodnitsky (1999).
19 Cf. e.g. Artzner et al. (1999, p. 223), Wirch/Hardy (1999, p. 339) or Barth (2000, p. 126 f.). Barth (2000)
uses the above general version of TCE. Artzner et al. (1999) and Wirch/Hardy (1999) consider the special
case, where the benchmark quantity z is identical to the value at risk of the investment considered.  In this
connection other authors, e.g. Embrechts/Resnick/Samorodnitsky (1999, p. 40) use the alternative term
“conditional value at risk”.
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MEL and TCE are connected by a simple (deterministic) translation.
The risk measure TCE has been receiving increasing attention in connection with the analysis
and management of financial risk, e.g. generalised value-at-risk analysis of market risk or
credit risk.20 In the sense of the system of axioms of Artzner et al. (1999) the TCE is - in con-
trast to the traditional value at risk - a coherent measure of risk.21 Barth characterises the TCE
as a worst-case risk measure22 which is very sensitive with respect to realisations at the tail of
the distribution, i.e. large-scale shortfalls, however, with a very small probability. With con-
sidering MEL instead of TCE the property of coherency is lost but the characterisation as a
worst case risk measure is preserved, which is sufficient for this contribution.
Between the shortfall measures introduced so far the following relation, which is rather intui-
tive, is valid23:
.)SP(  )MEL(  )SE( zzz ⋅= (4)
The mean shortfall level is simply the product of the mean level of shortfall given the occur-
rence of a shortfall and the probability of this occurrence.
The shortfall measures introduced above will be used in the following analysis. The bench-
mark-returns will be specified later on.
The following evaluation begins with an analysis of the risks (in the sense defined above) of
an investment that is representative for the German stock market relative to the development
of a risk-free (deterministic) benchmark depending on the time horizon. The DAX usually
serves as the standard representative for the development of German blue chip stocks. How-
ever, it specifically represents the viewpoint of a representative investor with a marginal tax
rate of 36% (resp. of 30% since 1994). Therefore, we have not used the original time series of
                                                
20 Cf. e.g. Artzner et al. (1999), Barth (2000), Embrechts et al. (1999), Wirch (1999) and Wirch/Hardy
(1999).
21 Cf. Barth (2000, S. 127) as well as Wirch/Hardy (1999, S. 330).
22 Cf. Barth (2000, S. 127).
23 Cf. in general Maurer (2000, S. 63).
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the DAX for our analysis but instead a corrected time series that assumes a domestic investor
with a tax rate of 0%, in the following referred to as DAX/0 (DAX according to Stehle24).
In addition to the correction of the tax effects, the DAX time series is inflation-adjusted,
which means all returns we have used are returns in real terms. Thus we assume for our study
rational investors that are free of money illusion, i.e. changes in price level that leave all real
terms unchanged do not lead to any changes in investment behavior.
To generate a representative distribution of real and tax-adjusted DAX returns the standard
model of the geometric Brownian motion has been assumed for the development of the DAX.
In a time-discrete context of successive one-year periods this assumption implies25 independ-
ent and lognormally distributed price changes or equivalently independent and normally dis-
tributed continuous rates of return. To generate the parameters of a representative distribution
of this kind, DAX returns of the evaluation period 1980 to 1999 have been applied. This time
period represents a rather positive development compared to other periods (average nominal
return of 15.47% and average real return of 12.88% from the viewpoint of an investor with a
tax-rate of 0%). To illustrate the sensitivity of our results regarding the chosen empirical pe-
riod of observation, an alternative 14-year evaluation period from 1986 - 1999 has also been
applied26 (average nominal return of 12.08% and average real return of 9.99% from the view-
point of an investors with a tax-rate of 0%).
Therefore not a historical time series but a probability distribution consistent to the empiri-
cally observed data has been taken as the basis of our evaluation. The representative density
functions of the time-continuous one year returns of the periods 1980 - 1999 and 1986 - 1999
respectively identified according to the above-mentioned method are shown in figure 1.
                                                
24 The DAX-adjustment mentioned, as well as others, are taken from publications of Richard Stehle, cf. e.g.
Stehle (1998, 1999). Updated versions of these DAX-adjustments can be found on the homepage of his
institute: http://www.wiwi.hu-berlin.de/finance.
25 Cf. e.g. Hull (1993, p. 210 ff.).
26 This alternative evaluation period eliminates especially the outlier return of 1985 of 86.35% in nominal
terms and 83.42% respectively in real terms from the viewpoint of an investor with a tax-rate of 0%.
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Figure 1: Representative distribution of the continuous DAX/0 returns in real terms,
evaluation periods 1980 - 1999 and 1986 - 1999 respectively
The return distributions presented in the above figure are the basis for the evaluation of the
shortfall-risks of a stock investment depending on the time horizon compared to a risk-free
investment with the alternative benchmark returns of 0%, 2% and 4% in real terms. To ensure
an analytical solution, a one-time investment in stocks has been applied.27
The second part of the evaluation consists of an analysis of the risks (in the sense defined
above) of a representative investment in the German stock market compared to a representa-
tive investment in the German bond market. The construction of the representative return-
distributions remains unchanged. For the German bond market the German bond performance
index REXP has been used as representative. A tax-adjustment is not necessary in the case of
the REXP since it is originally constructed from the viewpoint of an investor with a tax-rate
of 0%. To maintain comparability, the time series of the REXP28 is inflation-adjusted too, and
alternative distributions of the REXP-returns have been identified on the basis of the time
periods 1980 - 1999 and 1986 - 1999 respectively on the assumption of a geometric Brownian
                                                
27 In the case of a recurrent investment in stocks the evaluation has to be undertaken by means of a stochas-
tic simulation. This will be the subject of a subsequent study.
28 We wish to thank Deutsche Börse AG for providing the necessary data.
Density function of the DAX/0-returns in real terms 
for time periods 1980 -1999 versus 1986 -1999
0
1
-0,9 -0,8 -0,7 -0,6 -0,5 -0,4 -0,3 -0,2 -0,1 0 0,1 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,5 0,6 0,7 0,8 0,9 1 1,1
Annual return in real terms
time period 1986 - 1999
time period 1980  -1999
- 8 -
motion.29 Figure 2 compares the density function of the time-continuous REXP-returns in real
terms to those of the DAX/0 for the evaluation period 1980 - 1999. Furthermore, it visualises
the different risk/return profiles of both investments.30
Figure 2: Representative distributions of the continuous DAX/0- and REXP-return in real
terms, evaluation period 1980 - 1999
Within the scope of the definitions (1) - (4) of the shortfall-risk measures used, the REXP-
return distribution represents a stochastic benchmark z. For all technical details of the specifi-
cation and identification of the return distributions as well as the determination of the analyti-
cal expressions for the respective shortfall-risks, we refer to the appendix.
3. Long-term risks of stock investments: Deterministic benchmark-developments
Regarding the presentation of our evaluation, we begin with the results for the development
over time of the shortfall probability of the DAX/0 in real terms under the assumption of a
                                                
29 To be more precise, in order to be able to consider the correlation between stock and bond development a
two-dimensional geometric Brownian motion resp. bivariate normally distributed continuous rates of re-
turn have been used. For technical details we refer to the appendix.
30 For the concrete numerical specification of the return, the risk and the correlation, we refer to the appen-
dix.
Density function of the annual returns of the DAX/0 and the REXP in real terms
for the time period 1980-1999
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one-time investment. The developments of the risk-free benchmarks are based on the deter-
ministic target returns of 0%, 2% and 4%. Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the respective results for
the evaluation periods of both 1980 - 1999 and 1986 - 1999.
Figure 3: Development over time of the shortfall probability of the DAX/0 using different
target returns, evaluation period 1980 - 1999
Figure 4: Development over time of the shortfall probability of the DAX/0 using different
target returns, evaluation period 1986 - 1999
Development over time of the shortfall probability of the DAX/0
using target returns of 0%, 2% and 4% in real terms, evaluation period 1980 - 1999
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In principle, these results confirm a characteristic which Leibowitz/Krasker (1988) called per-
sistence of risk and which indicates that the shortfall probability of a stock investment does
not converge rapidly towards zero depending on time - as historical studies suggest - but
rather that this convergence is rather slow. Thus, even for very long time horizons, the short-
fall probability remains at a substantially high level. The level itself depends both on the tar-
get return chosen and on the assumed distribution of the stock returns.
Figures 5 and 6 show the corresponding results regarding the development over time of the
shortfall expectation. To ease the interpretation of the results, the development of the shortfall
expectation has been put in relation to the development of the corresponding risk-free bench-
mark and is thus shown as a percentage.
Figure 5: Development over time of the shortfall expectation of the DAX/0 using different
target returns, evaluation period 1980 - 1999
Development over time of the shortfall expectation of the DAX/0
using target returns of 0%, 2% and 4% in real terms, evaluation period 1980 - 1999
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Figure 6: Development over time of the shortfall expectation of the DAX/0 using different
target returns, evaluation period 1986 - 1999
Basically, after a phase of increasing risk at the beginning of the investment period, the short-
fall expectation of a stock investment shows a monotonously decreasing development. In ad-
dition, the shortfall expectation has, like the shortfall probability, a persistence-characteristic.
As with the level of the shortfall probability, the level of the remaining risk measured with the
shortfall expectation depends on the target return chosen and - even more obviously than in
the case of the shortfall probability - on the assumed representative distribution of the stock
returns.
The corresponding results for the risk measure mean excess loss are presented in the follow-
ing two figures 7 and 8. Again, the development of the mean excess loss has been put in rela-
tion to the development of the corresponding risk-free benchmark returns and thus is pre-
sented as a percentage.
Development over time of the shortfall expectation of the DAX/0
using target returns of 0%, 2% and 4% in real terms, evaluation period 1986 - 1999
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Figure 7: Development over time of the MEL of the DAX/0 using different target returns,
evaluation period 1980 - 1999
Figure 8: Development over time of the MEL of the DAX/0 using different target returns,
evaluation period 1986 - 1999
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The analysis of the (relative) mean excess loss reveals a new type of structural phenomenon:
the expected conditional shortfall-level is monotonously increasing over time. This phenome-
non is independent of both the benchmark return chosen and the return distribution chosen,
which only determines the level of the expected conditional shortfall. Therefore, from a
worst-case perspective the analysis of the worst-case risk measure MEL reveals that the risk
of a stock investment increases and thus shows the true risk of a stock investment.
Taking a shortfall relative to a benchmark of 0 % return in real terms, the level of mean ex-
cess loss after 30 years is - depending on the supposed distribution of stock returns - in aver-
age about 28% - 32% of the corresponding value. This is a substantially high shortfall level.
Tables 1 and 2 illustrate exact figures of the shortfall risk measures for chosen time horizons,
depending on the supposed distribution of stock returns.
Investment period 1 year 5 years 10 years 15 years 20 years 25 years 30 years
Target return 0% p.a.
SP 29,68 11,63 4,57 1,94 0,85 0,38 0,17
SE 4,01 2,48 1,12 0,50 0,23 0,10 0,05
MEL 13,52 21,36 24,41 25,93 26,85 27,48 27,93
Target return 2% p.a.
SP 32,58 15,63 7,66 4,01 2,17 1,20 0,67
SE 4,54 3,53 2,01 1,12 0,63 0,36 0,20
MEL 13,95 22,60 26,17 28,01 29,16 29,95 30,54
Target return 4% p.a.
SP 35,53 20,33 12,02 7,53 4,85 3,17 2,10
SE 5,11 4,87 3,38 2,28 1,54 1,04 0,70
MEL 14,38 23,94 28,11 30,33 31,75 32,76 33,52
Table 1: Shortfall risk (in %) of a one-time investment in the DAX/0 in real terms for vari-
ous target returns and chosen time horizons on the basis of the representative re-
turn-distribution 1980 - 1999
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Investment period 1 year 5 years 10 years 15 years 20 years 25 years 30 years
Target return 0% p.a.
SP 34,11 18,00 9,77 5,64 3,36 2,03 1,25
SE 4,88 4,23 2,68 1,66 1,03 0,64 0,40
MEL 14,32 23,50 27,39 29,43 30,72 31,63 32,30
Target return 2% p.a.
SP 37,14 23,15 14,96 10,18 7,10 5,04 3,61
SE 5,49 5,77 4,41 3,25 2,38 1,75 1,28
MEL 14,77 24,92 29,47 31,94 33,56 34,71 35,58
Target return 4% p.a.
SP 40,18 28,91 21,58 16,77 13,30 10,68 8,66
SE 6,12 7,64 6,85 5,83 4,89 4,08 3,41
MEL 15,24 26,44 31,76 34,75 36,76 38,22 39,35
Table 2: Shortfall risk (in %) of a one-time investment in the DAX/0 in real terms for vari-
ous target returns and chosen time horizons on the basis of the representative re-
turn-distribution 1986 - 1999
Kritzman (1994, S. 15) provides the following very intuitive explanation of Samuelson’s
(1963) classical result concerning the irrelevance of the time horizon for the level of the
stock-ratio of an investment: „The growing improbability of a loss is offset by the increasing
magnitude of potential losses.“
Thus, the main argument is that the occurrence of a loss from a stock investment becomes
more and more improbable, but at the same time goes hand in hand with an increasing level of
loss. In addition, these results make clear that the use of the shortfall probability alone is in-
sufficient for the assessment of the risk of stock investments in the long run. Consequently,
not only the probability of the occurrence of a loss or a shortfall, but also the possible extent
of loss, has to be taken into consideration.
By means of equation (4) and the results presented above the cited intuitive explanation of
Kritzman can be put on a theoretically precise basis. In addition it can be generalised with
respect to shortfall-events (compared to pure loss-events). Indeed, the probability of a loss or
a shortfall decreases with the length of the time horizon. However, the average level of the
loss or the shortfall respectively, given a loss or a shortfall has occured, increases. But, at
- 15 -
least31 at the level of the purely statistical relation (4), the balance of these two effects is not
compensatory. The shortfall probability over-compensates the mean excess loss to a certain
extent. The worst-case aspect of a long time investment in stocks is partly hidden by only
taking the shortfall probability into consideration. Thus, the elucidation of the worst-case risk
immanent in a long time investment in stocks represents an additional piece of information
that might be essential for investors.
All in all, the judgement of the long term risk of a stock investment is in a decisive way de-
pendent on the risk measure used and with it the perspective of risk-assessment. This study is
not meant to ascertain once and for all the “correct” risk measure but instead seeks greater
transparency with regard to the various facets of risk.
4. Long term risks of a stock investment relative to an investment in bonds
As pointed out in section 2, the second part of the evaluation applies to a stochastic bench-
mark on the basis of a representative distribution of REXP-returns in real terms. The follow-
ing figures 9 - 11 illustrate the development over time of the risk measures shortfall-
probability, shortfall expectation and mean excess loss of the DAX/0 relative to the REXP.
The representative distribution has been identified on the basis of the evaluation periods 1980
- 1999 and alternatively 1986 - 1999. In addition, table 3 contains the corresponding numeri-
cal results for the chosen time horizons.
                                                
31 A trade-off concerning the utility of these two components might arrive at different results. However, at
the moment a methodical approach is lacking to explicate this trade-off on a utility theoretical basis.
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Figure 9: Development over time of the shortfall probability of the DAX/0 relative to the
REXP on the basis of representative return distributions 1980 - 1999 and 1986 -
1999 respectively
Figure 10: Development over time of the shortfall expectation of the DAX/0 relative to the
REXP on the basis of representative return distributions 1980 - 1999 and 1986 -
1999 respectively
Development over time of the shortfall probability of the DAX/0 relative to the REXP 
evaluation periods 1980 - 1999 and 1986 - 1999 respectively
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30
Investment period
Sh
or
tfa
ll 
pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
evaluation period 1980-1999 evaluation period 1986-1999
Development over time of the shortfall expectation of the DAX/0 relative to the REXP 
evaluation periods 1980 - 1999 and 1986 - 1999 respectively
0%
1%
2%
3%
4%
5%
6%
7%
8%
9%
10%
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30
Investment period
Sh
or
tfa
ll 
ex
pe
ct
at
io
n
evaluation period 1980-1999 evaluation period 1986-1999
- 17 -
Figure 11: Development over time of the mean excess loss of the DAX/0 relative to the
REXP on the basis of representative return distributions 1980 - 1999 and 1986 -
1999 respectively
Investment period 1 year 5 years 10 years 15 years 20 years 25 years 30 years
Representative distribution 1980 - 1999
SP 36,69 22,34 14,10 9,38 6,41 4,45 3,12
SE 5,30 5,43 4,05 2,92 2,09 1,50 1,08
MEL 14,44 24,30 28,71 31,09 32,64 33,75 34,58
Representative distribution 1986 - 1999
SP 41,49 31,53 24,83 20,25 16,81 14,12 11,95
SE 6,48 8,64 8,22 7,36 6,49 5,68 4,95
MEL 15,62 27,39 33,11 36,37 38,58 40,21 41,47
Tab. 3: Shortfall risk (in %) of a one-time investment in the DAX/0 in real terms relative
to the REXP for chosen time horizons on the basis of representative return-
distributions 1980 - 1999 and 1986 - 1999
From a structural point of view, the results in this section completely back up the results for
deterministic benchmarks of section 3. Here, the dependence of the results on the evaluation
period chosen is even more obvious. The shortfall probability of the DAX/0 relative to the
REXP in principle is monotonous depending on the time horizon. Additionally, it shows a
persistence-characteristic which, for the evaluation period 1986 - 1999, is at a substantially
Development over time of the MEL of the DAX/0 relative to the REXP
evaluation periods 1980 - 1999 and 1986 - 1999 respectively
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high level. The shortfall expectation of the DAX/0 relative to the REXP - as like in section 3 -
increases at the beginning32 but decreases with the length of the investment period. The short-
fall expectation, too, has a persistence-characteristic which is substantially high for the
evaluation period 1986 - 1999. Finally, the development of the mean excess loss over time of
the DAX/0 relative to the REXP is monotonously increasing. Depending on the representative
distribution the evaluation is based on, the average level of the shortfall, given that the devel-
opment of the DAX/0 underperforms the development of the REXP, is 37% - 47%, which
again is a substantially high level.
5. Résumé
In this study we have examined the long-term risks of a representative one-time investment in
German stocks (DAX/0) in real terms relative to various risk-free investments (returns of 0%,
2% and 4% in real terms) as well as relative to a representative investment in German bonds
(REXP). As underlying risk measures the shortfall probability, the mean excess loss (condi-
tional shortfall expectation) as well as the product of these two measures, the shortfall expec-
tation have been used. From a structural point of view, both the shortfall probability and the
shortfall expectation show a monotonously decreasing development over time. The shortfall
expectation shows a phase of increasing value only at the beginning. However, both risk
measures have a persistence-characteristic, which means that the corresponding risk measure
does not converge rapidly but rather slowly against zero and that even for very long time ho-
rizons (30 years) the risk remains at a substantially high level.
In our opinion, the analysis of the mean excess loss reveals the true danger of a long term in-
vestment in stocks. From a worst-case perspective the risk of a stock investment increases
with the investment period and reaches substantial levels. This effect is concealed if only the
shortfall expectation is analysed since it is over-compensated by the higher convergence rate
(in relative terms) of the shortfall probability.
The structural pattern of the mean excess loss delivers the investor important information
about the long term risk of a stock investment. In fact, the probability of a shortfall decreases
                                                
32 After all, the time until the shortfall expectation sinks below its initial level is in the case of the evaluation
period 1986 - 1999 about 20 years.
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with an increasing time horizon. But if a shortfall occurs it may underperform the benchmark
at a substantial level which does not disappear with an increasing investment horizon but
rather grows.
This worst-case characteristic of a stock investment is not subject to a diversification effect
over time. According to the thesis that a stock investment in the long run (e.g. for pension
plans) has - at least partly - to be analysed from a worst-case perspective, the risk of a long
term investment in stocks must be seen in a different light.
- 20 -
Methodical Appendix
Let in the following {D(t); t ≥ 0} denote the development of the DAX and {R(t); t ≥ 0} corre-
spondingly the development of the REXP over time t. Let’s assume the process {(D(t), R(t)); t
≥ 0} is following a two-dimensional geometric Brownian motion.
Considering the continuous one-period returns
ID(t) := ln{D(t) / D(t-1)}
respectively
IR(t) := ln{R(t) / R(t-1)}
for a series of time points t = 1, ..., T, then (ID(t), IR(t)) are stochastically independent and
normally distributed two-dimensional random variables. Thus the empirical observations
(iD(t), iR(t)), t = 1, ..., T, can be seen as samples of a bivariate normal-distribution with expec-
tation-vector 



=
R
D
  
u
u
u  and variance-covariance-matrix 



σσρσ
σρσσ
=Σ 2
RRD
RD
2
D
  . Corre-
spondingly, the parameters in question can be estimated by their sample counterparts sample
mean, (adjusted) variance of the sample or standard deviation of the sample respectively and
correlation coefficient of the sample. In the case of the evaluation period 1980 - 1999 this
leads to the figures uD = 0,1288, sD = 0,2413, uR = 0,0475, sR = 0,054 and ρ = 0,1545. In the
case of the evaluation period 1986 - 1999 this leads to the figures uD = 0,0999, sD = 0,2440, uR
= 0,0467, sR = 0,0562 and ρ = 0,057.
Letting R(t) be a stochastic benchmark, relative to which the shortfall of D(t) is measured, we
obtain: 1  )R(
)D(
  )R(  )D( <⇔<
t
t
tt , i.e. we equivalently examine the shortfall of )R(
)D(
t
t
 relative to
1. Consequently we have the case of a deterministic benchmark.
Since ∑∑
==
=


 t
1
R
t
1
D )(I - )(I  )R(
)D(ln 
ττ
ττ
t
t
 and thus is a sum of normally distributed random vari-
ables, the quotient D(t)/R(t) is at any moment logarithmically normally distributed with the
parameters mt and vt, i.e.
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 )R(
)D(ln 

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
t
t
∼ N(mt, vt).
Especially
mt = t(uD - uR) + ln(D0/R0)
vt
2
 = t[ RD2R2D 2 σρσσσ −+ ].
holds true.
Assuming now that in t = 0 the initial investments in the DAX and the REXP have the same
amount, i.e. D0 = R0, we furthermore obtain:
mt = t(uD - uR).
The shortfall risk measures of the DAX relative to the REXP result in:



= 0) ,)R(
)D(
 - (1max E (1)SE D/R t
t
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 - 1E  (1)MEL
D/R
D/R
D/R
=
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

<=
t
t
t
t
If, e.g. the MELD/R(1) = 0,25, this result is to be interpreted as follows: If D(t) < R(t), then
D(t) in average is 25% below R(t).
The analytically closed evaluation of the SPD/R, SWD/R and with it the MELD/R is based on
D(t)/R(t) ∼ LN(mt, vt), e.g. according to the results of Maurer (2000, S. 73) where z = 1 and qt
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= (lnz - mt) / vt = -mt / vt and SPz(t) = φ(qt) as well as SEz(t) = zφ(qt) - exp(mt + ½vt2) φ(qt - vt),
and φ(x) denotes the distribution function of the standard normal distribution.
With R(t) = D(0)ert we obtain the case of deterministic targets, especially σR = ρ = 0 and uR =
r hold true. First of all we obtain:
. 
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This is equivalent to the MEL of D(t) concerning z = D(0)ert relative to the development of
the benchmark D(0)ert.
By analogy we obtain:
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